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‘The...months Schlesinger was at CIA were a bad time. Senior officials went from a DCI 
[Richard Helms] who was one of them, understood the heart and soul of intelligence, and was a 
gentleman of the old school, to a DCI who had a mandate from Nixon to shake things up’.ii 




In his memoir, The Night Watch, David Atlee Phillips, a former chief of Latin 
American operations for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), revealed that he 
had polled a host of retired colleagues on how they rated the various directors of 
the CIA from Allen Dulles (1953-1961) to William Colby (1973-1976). To gauge 
their feelings on the matter, he asked two questions. One: ‘If I were shipwrecked 
on a desert island, a pleasant one with abundant food, good climate, a supply of 
scotch and every hope a ship would pass by, I would choose to be with...?’ And 
two: ‘If I were to be shipwrecked on a terrible desert island, with little food and 
amenities, with scant hope for survival and I wanted to escape badly, I would 
choose to be with...?’iii  
When it came to the first question, Dulles won hands down. Respondents 
remarked how pleasant it would be to be stranded with the genial spymaster, a 
raconteur known for his skill and wit in spinning a yarn. Respondents also believed 
that Dulles would devise a plan to get everyone off the island, although he himself 
would refrain from getting his hands dirty, assuming the role of ‘supervisor’ rather 
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than ‘doer’. When it came to the second question, Richard Helms (1966-1973) 
came top. Like Dulles, Helms was a charming conversationalist, but he also a 
possessed a steely determination to get things done. Honourable mentions also 
went to John McCone (1961-65) and William “Red” Raborn (1965-66), with one 
respondent commenting that McCone, a former ship-builder, would build a boat 
out of seaweed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Colby divided opinion: while some 
believed that he had kept the Agency from destroying itself, or from being 
destroyed by outsiders, by taking the controversial decision to reveal some of the 
CIA’s darkest secrets to Congress, others could not forgive him for his candidness 
on the witness table.  
There was one Director no one wanted to be abandoned with: James 
Rodney Schlesinger. Indeed, Philips explained that he did not even ask his 
colleagues for their opinion of Schlesinger, knowing that the answer would be 
universally negative. The author Brian Freemantle has written that, ‘The degree of 
hatred engendered by Schlesinger was astounding’.iv CIA veterans refer to his 
directorship as a ‘reign of terror’.v Phillips claimed that Schlesinger ‘left behind a 
CIA seething with resentment and rancor’.vi His unpopularity amongst staff was 
such that the Agency’s Office of Security had to provide him with extra 
bodyguards, to escort him to and from headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Bulletin 
boards were replete with unflattering caricatures. Reportedly, a special closed 
circuit television camera was installed opposite his official portrait because of fears 
that it would be vandalised by disgruntled employees.vii 
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The level of animosity shown towards Schlesinger is fairly remarkable when 
we consider that he was in the job for barely six months. He was nominated by 
President Richard Nixon on 21 December 1972. His appointment was confirmed 
by the Senate on 23 January 1973, and he was officially sworn in as the Agency’s 
ninth Director on 2 February 1973. At the age of 43, he was the youngest person 
ever to occupy the position. By the summer, however, he was gone. On 2 July, he 
became Secretary of Defense. 
Our understanding of why Schlesinger was so disliked is presently 
insufficient. Also inedquate is our undertanding of the implications of this 
unpopularity.viii Unlike other directors, including Dulles, Colby, Helms, George 
Tenet (1996-2004), and most recently Leon Panetta (2009-2011), Schlesinger has 
not written a memoir.ix Nor has anyone written a biography of him. With some 
justification, authors have been more preoccupied with his predecessor Helms and 
his successor Colby, two of the great Cold War spymasters.x The few words that 
have been written about Schlesinger in larger histories of the CIA attribute much 
of the animosity to some painful personnel reductions and, above all, his directive 
to staff, on 9 May, requiring them to report to him all activities going on, or in the 
past, which might be interpreted as being outside of the CIA’s legislative charter. 
As a result of this sweeping edict, the “Family Jewels” were born – a 693-page 
report of abuses which, when leaked in late 1974, led inexorably to a year of 
unprecedented public and congressional scrutiny of the CIA and brought about a 
new era of oversight for US intelligence.xi According to Freemantle, Schlesinger 
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was loathed for priming ‘probably the biggest bombshell ever to explode’ in CIA 
history.xii 
This article will revisit Schlesinger’s period as CIA Director and, by 
extension, his time as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), responsible for 
coordinating national collection and analysis, and claim that the negative feelings 
about him went far deeper than has been suggested. Drawing on interviews with 
retired intelligence officers; spy memoirs; newly declassified records from the 
CIA’s CREST database; plus some materials from Schlesinger’s private collection, 
which has been weeded, redacted, and recently opened for public inspection at the 
Library of Congress; it will be argued that Schlesinger was disliked because he 
challenged the culture of the CIA, with important consequences for the Agency and 
its workforce. 
Culture is, of course, is a slippery term; trying to define it has been likened 
to capturing air. It nevertheless holds enormous value for anyone seeking to 
understand the basic assumptions, values, beliefs, customs, procedures and 
behaviors of social groups. Since its creation in 1947, the CIA had developed its 
own unique culture – one it believed was well-suited to the job of producing 
accurate and actionable intelligence to policymakers. This culture dictated that, 
while the CIA existed to serve Presidents, it had to keep its distance to ensure that 
it was not susceptible to manipulation in support of political goals. It prioritised 
the role of humans, working overseas as clandestine agents, above technical 
methods of collection. It held secrecy to be absolutely sacred. It favoured reform 
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from within, not from outside, rendering it analogous to what the French 
sociologist of culture Pierre Bourdieu calls a ‘habitus’. Bourdieu has taught us that 
a habitus is open to modification and reconstruction, but typically through 
reflexive agency rather than through encounters with outside forces; external 
interference threatens the habitual actions that are intuitively performed by 
members of the group and thus threaten the culture. The culture of the CIA also 
hinged on a daring ‘can do’ spirit, perfectly encapsulated by William Baker, 
scientific adviser to five Presidents during the Cold War, who recollected in an 
interview in 1996 that the CIA would never flinch at ‘jumping out of planes and so 
on’.xiii  
In what follows, it will be shown that Schlesinger’s six months at CIA 
represented an iconoclastic attack on the Agency’s culture. A firm disciplinarian, 
solid and self-assured, with a gruff disdain for the creature comforts of high office 
(he despised cocktail parties with a theological intensity), Schlesinger represented a 
radical departure from the ‘band of brothers’ style of leadership of previous CIA 
directors, Allen Dulles especially, fabled for his ‘ho-ho-ho’ laugh that evoked the 
spirit of a college professor. An outsider, with no background in intelligence, he 
did not even want the job – it was just another stepping stone – but went in all 
guns blazing.  
Fundamentally, Schlesinger was Nixon’s ‘axe man’, a bulldozing political 
fixer. He did not subscribe to the notion that intelligence should be separated from 
policy or political issues, so as to ensure that agencies remain a source of unbiased 
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and unblemished assessment and not aggressive advocates of policy in their own 
right. His feeling was that the CIA operated in a self-protected bubble, which had 
grown isolated in suburbia and too remote from those who make policy. His 
objective: to make the CIA a service organization of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. If 
this meant intelligence being mixed up in partisan matters, then so be it. As Helms 
remarked in his memoirs, Schlesinger had orders to ‘make the Agency a more 
responsive element of the Nixon administration’.xiv On his watch, CIA officers 
were told to get with the president’s program or get out – literally, as well as 
figuratively. True to Nixon’s wishes, he instituted far-reaching bureaucratic 
changes, including redundancies and retirements, ostensibly as part of an economy 
drive to make the CIA more efficient, but with a hidden agenda to clip the wings 
of the agency’s senior managers and render the CIA more in tune with the 
president’s agenda. 
Targeting the existing culture, it will be suggested that Schlesinger wielded 
his axe particularly fearsomely in the direction of the old guard of the clandestine 
service, the prized undercover arm of the CIA that collected human intelligence 
(HUMINT) abroad and conducted covert operations. Secretive, insular, and full of 
buccanneering vigour, the clandestine service was the heartbeat of the agency, the 
holy of holies that had guided the ageny’s thinking and behaviour through its 
formative years. Schlesinger, however, wanted to change this. In his opinion, it 
needed modernising: its ways were inefficient, out of step with the brute realities of 
the modern world, and had resulted in the feathering of nests and ‘blowback’.xv 
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The ‘can do’ ethos, he held, was a myth that had led the CIA to take unnecessary 
risks in the realm of overseas covert action that had backfired, such as the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco in April 1961. The future of intelligence, he believed, would revolve 
around satellites, computers, and ultra-sophisticated military technologies – not 
spies playing games in the shadows.  
For CIA employees, the consequences of Schlesinger’s top-down 
programme of change was something approaching what Yiannis Gabriel has 
described as ‘organizational miasma’.xvi From Greek tragedy, miasma is a term used 
to denote a social group in the grip of turmoil or fear. According to Gabriel, 
miasma occurs in certain organisations that experience sudden and severe 
transformations, initiated by a single individual, typically the leader, and involving 
the loss of many valued members. Unlike other forms of organisational upheaval, 
it does not produce collective or successful resistance; staff are powerless to do 
anything in the face of the brutualisation. Confidence and self-worth are shattered: 
feelings of worthlessness, even guilt, become contagious, damaging motivation and 
efficiency. With carte blanche from Nixon to rattle people’s cages, Schlesinger 
caused miasma at CIA. His time at Langley saw a paralysis of resistance and the 








In the years leading up to his appointment as DCI in early 1973, Schlesinger had 
established himself within the Washington Beltway as an abrasive, formidably-
intelligent, administration insider. Born in 1929 in New York City, he graduated 
from the exclusive Horace Mann School in the Bronx, before moving to Harvard, 
where he took a BA in 1950, a Master’s in 1952 and a Doctorate in 1956, all in 
economics. At Harvard, he was a classmate and intellectual rival of Henry 
Kissinger, who later wrote that he considered Schlesinger ‘at least my equal in 
intelligence’, but even more egotistical: ‘I conceded him pride of place in 
arrogance’!xvii After a spell as an Economics Professor at the University of Virginia, 
in 1963 he took a job at the Rand Corporation, a Californian think tank, where he 
rose to become Director of Strategic Studies. In 1969, he joined the newly-elected 
Nixon Administration as Assistant Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), where he earned a reputation as a budget-cutter and someone who 
was unafraid to make unpopular decisions with scant regard for what people 
thought of him. An avid birdwatcher in his spare time, he kept binoculars by his 
office window so that he could spy on the car park and reprimand staff who 
arrived late for work.xviii His management style was no-nonsense and to the point. 
When an ill-advised Army colonel came to his office to give a presentation armed 
with charts, graphs and diagrams, he growled at him, ‘Just cut out the Pentagon 
baloney and give me the damn facts’.xix First in the office at 7am and invariably the 
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last to leave long after dark, he was nevertheless as tough on himself as he was on 
others.  
At the OMB, Schlesinger became drawn into the President’s private battle 
with the CIA. It is worth taking a moment to contextualise this. Nixon harbored 
deep-rooted suspicions about the Agency. As the son of a Los Angeles tram driver, 
who grew up in a house built from a kit with no electricity or running water, and 
who attended Whittier College because he did not have the money to take up a 
scholarship at Harvard, he had a chip on his shoulder about people who, unlike 
himself, had never had to struggle for anything in life. Populated by the 
descendants of wealthy families, expensive prep schools, Ivy League universities, 
and exclusive clubs, the CIA was precisely the old school tie bastion and vestige of 
the East Coast Establishment that he felt he had been fighting his whole life and 
which, he believed, opposed him politically. According to Alexander Butterfield, 
the presidential aide who famously revealed the existence of the White House 
taping system to the Senate Watergate Committee, Nixon possessed a pathological 
hatred of ‘Langley liberals’ – and would routinely be heard saying ‘I’m gonna get 
those sons of bitches’.xx Nixon held the CIA largely responsible for his narrow 
presidential election defeat to John F. Kennedy in 1960. In the campaign, Kennedy 
had relied heavily on a ‘missile gap’ between the US and the USSR to attack the 
Republican Eisenhower-Nixon administration as being soft on national security. In 
reality, there was no gap – or rather there was, but strongly in favour of the US. 
Insecure to the point of paranoia, Nixon clung to the theory that CIA officers – 
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instructed to brief the Democratic candidate – had deliberately withheld the 
knowledge that there was no gap, in a sinister scheme to secure his defeat at the 
polls.  
After becoming President in January 1969, Nixon’s opinion of the CIA went 
from bad to worse. At a critical time when he and his national security adviser 
Henry Kissinger commenced SALT negotiations with Moscow and formulated 
policy on US missile programmes, there was general dissatisfaction with the 
Agency’s Soviet estimate, particularly related to strategic capabilities. As several 
authors have shown, there was an under-appreciation of Soviet ICBM production 
levels (SS-9s and SS-11s), plus confusion over the nature of the SS-9 re-entry 
system (was it a three warhead MRV or MIRv configuration?).xxi Intelligence is not, 
of course, an exact science; but Nixon expected better, especially when estimates 
were supposed to be brightest star in the Agency’s firmament. He and Kissinger 
were also displeased with the CIA’s failure to warn of several important episodes. 
For example, in their view, the CIA was slow in detecting that the Soviets were 
planning to build a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba.xxii After the 
Agency had failed to warn Nixon of the overthrow of the Cambodian head of 
state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, he barked to White House Chief of Staff H.R. 
Haldeman ‘Get rid of the clowns. What use are they? They’ve got 40,000 people 
over there reading newspapers’, and made his point symbolically by returning to 
the CIA a thick package of Presidential Daily Briefs (PDB) unopened.xxiii In 
December 1970, therefore, with reservations about the loyalty and competence of 
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the CIA, and with the overall goal of tightening CIA bondage to the White House, 
he asked Schlesinger to carry out a review of the intelligence community. As 
Thomas Powers has argued, far from being a routine paper exercise, with boxes 
simply being rearranged on an organization flowchart, the study was intended to 
produce real change.xxiv 
Career CIA officials resented the idea of a brash young interloper like 
Schlesinger meddling in their organisation. The review was interpreted as another 
attempt by Nixon to impose his political will on the Agency and limit their 
influence on policy. Earlier, the President had caused consternation by trying to 
introduce a procedure whereby Helms would be required to leave National 
Security Council (NSC) meetings after delivering the intelligence briefing.xxv 
Controversially, Nixon had appointed Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, 
one of his former military aides, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
(DDCI). According to John Ehrlichman, the president’s assistant and White House 
special counsel, Nixon intended Cushman to be ‘his man over there at the Agency’, 
to ‘keep track’ of Helms, the personification of the Eastern Establishment he 
despised.xxvi  
Blandly entitled A Review of the Intelligence Community, Schlesinger’s report of 
March 1971 was a damning indictment of the way the CIA went about its business, 
striking at the very heart of the established culture. It began by noting ‘two 
disturbing phenomena’: one, a ‘spectacular’ increase in the cost of intelligence; and 
two, a failure to achieve a ‘commensurate improvement in the scope and overall 
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quantity of intelligence products’.xxvii The total cost of intelligence, hidden by 
financial sleight of hand, was estimated to be at least twice the figure passed to 
Congress. The report went on to suggest that the intelligence community had 
responded haphazardly to the development of improved collection technologies 
such as satellite photography, telemetry, and electronic intelligence, which had 
blurred the once-clear lines between “national” and “tactical” intelligence. In this 
context, intelligence agencies had engaged in costly and duplicative missions. The 
report claimed that the DCI’s theoretical command of the entire intelligence 
community was a fiction. In reality, given the wide deployment of resources, 
disparate and competing interests, and jurisdictional boundaries within the 
community, it suggested that the DCI failed to exert any meaningful control. 
Finally, the report considered the CIA ‘claustrophobically insular’ and backward-
thinking on account of its unwillingness to recruit outside of narrowly-constituted 
networks.xxviii Following in the footsteps of General “Wild Bill” Donovan’s Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS), which had earned the nickname ‘Oh So Social’, the 
CIA had tended to fill the top jobs with Ivy League graduates and clubbale 
‘easterners’, relying on informal ties with friendly college professors to spot the 
best talent. Colby later spoke in terms of the CIA taking ‘the cream of the 
academic and social aristocracy’.xxix    
Nixon took the review extremely seriously. In a memorandum to members 
of the NSC, he emphasised that the need for an improved intelligence product and 
streamlining the nation’s sprawling intelligence network was ‘urgent’, owing to the 
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growing relative strength of Soviet forces in areas where US superiority was 
previously unquestioned.xxx Schlesinger’s report made several recommendations, 
the most significant being the idea that the DCI should assume a greater leadership 
role over the intelligence community as a whole. Most DCIs had devoted the 
lionshare of their time and efforts to running the CIA, going about their 
community functions as an aside.xxxi For example, Helms’s calculation was that the 
best way to protect CIA interests was to steer clear of inter-agency disputes and 
avoid barking out orders to rival departments. In the words of Colby, he ‘had far 
too exquisite a sense of political realities to get into a fight he knew couldn’t win’, 
and so refrained from adopting a dominant position in managing the 
community.xxxii In contrast, Schlesinger argued that it was the job of the DCI to put 
the community first, not the CIA. As he saw it, the problems experienced by the 
community – from spiraling costs to poor analysis and slow responsiveness – were 
problems that stemmed from the lack of strong, central, leadership by the DCI. To 
correct this, he presented a range of options, from the suggestion of a new 
intelligence coordinator in the White House to the creation of a fully-fledged 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the unambiguous authority to 
coordinate programs, prepare budgets, and control personnel across the 
community. 
On 5 November 1971, Nixon issued a presidential directive on intelligence 
reorganization, infused with the language of austerity.xxxiii Based largely on 
Schlesinger’s report, it ordered the DCI to assume an ‘enhanced leadership role’, 
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albeit the directive did not call for the creation of a powerful DNI, which would 
have required new legislation from Congress. Specifically, the directive established 
the post of deputy to the DCI for ‘Community Affairs’, and gave the DCI an 
‘Intelligence Community Staff’ to assist him in managing the Community’s 
budgets, plans, and programs. It ordered the DCI to work with the OMB, every 
year, in preparing and submitting a consolidated intelligence budget. Spending cuts 
were the name of the game; to help, a new Intelligence Resources Advisory 
Committee was established, with the DCI as chairman, consisting of 
representatives from the State Department, Pentagon and the OMB. ‘The need for 
some savings is urgent’, the directive underlined.xxxiv In a bid to ensure that the CIA 
got with the program, Nixon sent a separate note to Helms, a few days earlier, 
instructing him to ‘give the role of community leadership your primary attention’ 
and delegate, as much as possible, the day-to-day running of the CIA to the 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.xxxv Rhetorically, the President gave Helms 
his full support, saying to him: ‘If you have any trouble doing this, you let me 
know’.xxxvi 
Over the coming months, much to Nixon’s dismay, there was little evidence 
of Helms putting the directive into effect. No concrete plans were drawn up on 
how to cut costs, whilst Helms had been reluctant to hand over the quotidian 
management of the CIA to the DDCI. By April 1972, NSC staff were complaining 
that Helms was ‘proceeding very slowly and cautiously’ in implementing Nixon’s 
directive. Andrew Marshall, the resident NSC adviser on intelligence matters, wrote 
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to Kissinger and suggested that ‘We probably will have to put some pressure on 
Helms to get more rapid progress towards the President’s goals’.xxxvii Marshall had 
his own negative feelings about the CIA. Earlier, he had written to Schlesinger, a 
close friend, saying that the ‘US needs a much better clandestine service than it 
has’.xxxviii Marshall was particularly troubled by what he called the CIA’s ‘OSS 
ancestorship’, writing: ‘The action types inherited from OSS gave the organization, 
and recruiting, an action basis. They do not have the patience and talent to develop 
quieter intelligence gathering activities as they should’.xxxix Acting on Marshall’s 
advice, Kissinger asked Helms to produce a six-month progress report, to be 
completed by no later than 5 May.  
Helms, however, continued to drag his feet. In a letter to Kissinger, he 
wrote: ‘I see this as being an evolutionary process for quite a considerable period’.xl 
Helms’s reluctance to make changes was born of several factors. One, the 
proposed reforms, with their emphasis on community management by the DCI, 
did not exactly excite him since he did not like to manage. As Douglas Garthoff 
has suggested, he ‘viewed his community role with a healthy dose of distaste, as a 
necessary and useful activity, but not something he embraced enthusiastically’.xli 
Two, for all his rhetorical gusto about Helms having his unqualified backing, 
Nixon gave very little practical direction to his DCI, his attention being focused on 
extricating the United States from Vietnam without acknowlelding defeat and 
conducting a successful re-election campaign.xlii Helms alluded to this in a speech 
to a packed audience in the Agency’s auditorium – the “Bubble” – in June 1972: 
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‘One must recognize that in empowering me to take certain actions...I wasn’t given 
any strength to do them’. Moments later, he then said:  ‘I want to withdraw that. I 
wasn’t ‘empowered’ to do anything. I was asked to do certain things’.xliii Three, 
Helms suspected that the ultimate goal of the reforms was to increase White 
House control of the CIA. For example, ostensibly in a bid to facilitate a more 
fruitful conversation between intelligence professionals and the consumers of their 
product, Nixon had proposed a new National Intelligence Committee under the 
NSC – but with Kissinger, his chief consigliere, as chairman. Finally, as evidenced in 
and beyond his memoirs, Helms recognised that Nixon saw him as part of the 
problem, not the solution.xliv As a result, he lacked the motivation to get behind the 
reforms.  
Conveniently overlooking his own shortcomings, Nixon became 
increasingly agitated with his DCI’s failure to execute the Schlesinger plan. He had 
given an order, and he expected it to be carried out. The fact that Helms had done 
nothing only served to heighten his suspicion that the CIA was against him and his 
agenda. In an angry memorandum to Haldeman on 18 May 1972, he explained that 
the ‘problem’ with the CIA was twofold: one, that it possessed a ‘muscle-bound 
bureaucracy which has completely paralyzed its brain’; and two, that its personnel 
was ‘primarily Ivy League and the Georgetown set’.xlv At the end of the year, with 
his re-election now confirmed, he wrote again to Haldeman to lament that 
‘Schlesinger’s report of 2 years ago has not been implemented in any respect’.xlvi By 
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this point, he had concluded that Helms had to go, and that Schlesinger should 






Tough, hard-headed, and not one to suffer fools, Schlesinger had all the qualities 
Nixon required of someone who was expected to stir the pot at Langley. 
Moreover, as the official who had studied the CIA and made recommendations to 
reform it, he was seen as the obvious choice to engineer their smooth 
implementation.xlvii  
Schlesinger arrived under a cloud when he walked through the doors at 
Langley for the first time as Director on 2 February 1973. His reputation preceded 
him as the cocky outsider who, with only an academic grasp of intelligence, had 
had the audacity to tell the President that he wasn’t getting good value for money 
from the CIA. In the hallways and around water-coolers, staff sneered when they 
learned that Colby had been asked to provide him with a reading list of instructive 
spy books, consisting of The Craft of Intelligence by Allen Dulles, The Real CIA by 
Lyman Kirkpatrick, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy by Sherman Kent, 
The Invisible Government by David Wise and Thomas Ross, and The Double-Cross 
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System by John Masterman.xlviii Running a spy agency was surely no job for such a 
‘Johnny-come-lately’.  
There was a great deal of anger and confusion at the circumstances that had 
led to his appointment. The in-house perception was that Helms had been ‘kicked 
downstairs’ – to quote Atlee Phillips – by a spiteful Nixon in revenge for Helms’s 
refusal to implicate the CIA in the Watergate cover-up.xlix In the days following the 
break-in of the Democratic Party HQ in Washington DC in June 1972, the 
President had brazenly asked his DCI to pay the bail money for the burglars and to 
halt the FBI’s investigation into the affair. Rightly, Helms had refused, but a short 
while later he was summoned to Camp David and fired (or, he was offered and 
accepted the ‘lesser’ job of Ambassador to Iran). CIA personnel were also bitter at 
the timing of the dismissal. Helms, who had been in the CIA for nearly three 
decades and was a hugely respected professional, was 6 weeks shy of the Agency’s 
automatic retirement age of 60 when Nixon informed him that he was being 
pushed out. The decent thing, therefore, would have been to let him retire 
gracefully after his birthday. Moreover, this would have raised fewer questions. Yet 
– ‘in a move of surpassing pettiness’ (Kissinger’s words) – Nixon insisted that the 
changeover occur right away.l Mindful of the distaste this would cause, Schlesinger 
tried, but failed to persuade Nixon otherwise.li Years later, in an interview, he said 
that ‘The administration’s intent was more or less to show the dominance of the 
president over the senior people in the administration, so they wanted me to move 
into the DCI slot immediately’.lii Helms wrote in his memoirs that the speed of the 
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transition prevented him from arranging a proper ‘farewell session’ with colleagues. 
A few days after clearing out his desk, he allegedly confronted Haldeman and 
asked, ‘What happened to our understanding that my exit would be postponed for 
a few weeks?’ With a slight grin on his face, he replied, ‘Oh, I guess we forgot’.liii   
It did not take long for Schlesinger to start putting noses out of joint. In his 
memoir, Honorable Men, Colby recollected that Schlesinger came on strong, ‘his 
shirt tails flying, determined, with that bulldog, abrasive temperament of his, to 
implement [his] ideas’.liv From the outset, he took steps to distance himself 
symbolically from the existing culture. Having steadfastly refused to meet Helms 
during the transition period, he proceeded to take possession of the Director’s 
suite and immediately ordered for a wall to be knocked down to enlarge his 
personal office space.lv In an unmistakable repudiation of the old regime, he 
declined the opportunity to inherit the outgoing Director’s secretary, Elizabeth 
Dunlevy, asserting coldly: ‘I won’t be needing her’.lvi In the same spirit, he 
pointedly renamed the title of the clandestine service wing of the CIA from the 
‘Directorate of Plans’, which he considered a misleading euphemism, to the more 
straightforward ‘Directorate of Operations’ (DO). To signal that the CIA had for 
too long obsessed about secrecy, he erected green and white highway signs on the 
George Washington Memorial Parkway noting the exit for CIA headquarters. 
Amusingly, college students evidently thought they looked better in their dorm 
rooms, since no fewer than 9 signs went missing, some within hours of being 
erected. lvii  
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It is hard to disagree with John Ranelagh’s conclusion that Schlesinger was 
the Agency’s first ‘political director’, with a mandate from the White House to 
make the CIA less of a rigid bureaucracy and more of a loyal presidential 
instrument.lviii His first words to the CIA’s senior management were, ‘I’m here to 
make sure you don’t screw Richard Nixon’.lix In a speech to 300 senior officers on 
5 March 1973, he emphasised on two occasions that it was the job of the CIA to 
serve the President, with Nixon specifically mentioned by name. (His notes for this 
speech have the words ‘serve’ and ‘serving’ underlined.)lx At meetings, he 
sneeringly reminded staff that the ‘CIA is part of the American government, you 
know’.lxi Before relaying intelligence matters to the broader forum of the NSC, he 
would always report to Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, first. In doing 
so, Haldeman became something of a gatekeeper, filtering intelligence before it was 
put up for collective discussion.  
As Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has claimed, Schlesinger ‘concentrated intelligence 
authority in his own hands in a way that the White House would be even more 
firmly in control of the informational bases of foreign policy’.lxii In contrast to 
Helms, who, as discussed, was unwilling to exert his community role more 
forcefully for fear of enmeshing the CIA in bitter bureaucratic turf wars with rival 
departments, Schlesinger made every effort to be more than just a titular head of 
the intelligence community. He appointed himself Chairman of the Intelligence 
Resources Advisory Commission, with responsibility for the National Security 
Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and formally designated 
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the DCI as the head of the intelligence community, thus giving himself extra 
flexibility as community-leader to assist the President politically. In a testimony 
prepared for Congress during his first month in office, he underlined: ‘I do plan to 
devote the greatest part of my time and energies to overseeing intelligence 
community affairs’.lxiii To help facilitate this, he put into effect his earlier 
recommendation that the daily affairs of the CIA should be delegated as much as 
practically possible to the DDCI. On several occasions, DDCI Lt. General Vernon 
Walters was required to give speeches about the CIA whilst Schlesinger performed 
his community role, such as convening the United States Intelligence Board.lxiv In 
short, community came first. 
In a possible attempt to make the CIA more loyal to the president, he 
started a process of review that would eventually lead to the abolition of the CIA’s 
cherished Office of National Estimates, which coordinated the product of the 
wider intelligence community. The move had all the hallmarks of Kissinger. 
Kissinger had a low opinion of the Office’s assessments of world affairs, which 
were typically at odds with his own, and wanted estimators who were prepared to 
lay their judgements on the line, rather than ‘hedging’ to avoid ever being wholly 
right or wholly wrong. In his autobiography, The White House Years, he criticised 
what he perceived as the analytic caution and guarded judgments of the Office’s 
reports. His experience of the CIA was that, ‘Far from being the hawkish band of 
international adventurers so facilely portrayed by its critics, [it] usually erred on the 
side of the interpretation fashionable in the Washington Establishment’.lxv ‘In my 
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experience’, he continued, ‘the CIA developed rationales for inaction much more 
frequently than daring thrusts’.lxvi In June 1973, most likely in league with 
Kissinger, Schlesinger dismissed John Huizenga, then chairman of the Office’s 
overseeing board. The Washington Post commented wryly that Huizenga had paid 
the price for being ‘the bearer of unwelcome tidings’ to the administration; in other 
words, for not telling them what they wanted to hear.lxvii Colby eventually abolished 
the Office in September 1973. In its place a new office was born whose job it was 
to write estimates to order for the NSC, rather produce them of its own volition, 
thus giving Kissinger and Nixon more control over what was being produced by 






With his uncombed white-hair, rumpled tweed jacket, scrawny tie, pipe, and 
shirttail hanging out, Schlesinger had the look of a genial academic. Looks, 
however, can be deceiving; Schlesinger was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Future CIA 
Director Robert Gates, a junior analyst on Soviet affairs during Schlesinger’s short 
but stormy directorship, has described him as ‘crude’, ‘demanding’, ‘arrogant’, and 
‘dismissive of experience’.lxix Another CIA man Peter Earnest, now Executive 
Director at the International Spy Museum, has called him a ‘hard ass’.lxx Reflecting 
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on his career, Schlesinger later admitted that his blunt manner must have made 
him incredibly hard to work with.lxxi On one occasion, after a meeting in which he 
had made a cutting remark about the President’s negotiating skills, Nixon fumed: ‘I 
don’t want to see that guy in my office again’.lxxii At CIA, his abrasiveness was 
apparent from the get go. During his first week, he infamously reproached an 
employee for taking an afternoon haircut at the onsite barber at Langley. When the 
stunned employee responded that he had grown half of his hair ‘on company time’, 
Schlesinger ordered the stylist to cut only 50 per cent of the man’s hair!lxxiii Such an 
encounter – while perhaps humorous in hindsight – was typical of the way that 
Schlesinger ‘objectified’ employees: reducing them to their work qualities, seeing 
them as things instead of people, and ultimately treating them with a lack of 
respect. Objectification of staff, argues Yiannis Gabriel, is a common characteristic 
of any organization intoxicated by miasma. 
If there was one episode that typified Schlesinger’s no-nonsense personality 
it was his instigation and management of a rolling program of ‘slash-and-burn’ 
personnel reductions, now known as the “Schlesinger Purge”. There had long been 
talk in the Nixon White House of paring down the CIA’s workforce – or, as Nixon 
liked to call it, ‘cutting the CIA down to size’. On 25 November 1970, in a letter to 
Kissinger, Alexander Haig, one of Nixon’s closest aides and later White House 
Chief of Staff, quoted the President as saying that he wanted a ‘complete 
housecleaning over there [at CIA]’ because they were not on his ‘wavelength’.lxxiv In 
July 1971, at a budget meeting, Nixon declared that the CIA ‘isn’t worth a damn’ 
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and asked for a ‘25 per cent [reduction] across the board’, to ‘get rid of the disloyal 
types’.lxxv Yet, as long as Helms was Director, downsizing had been impossible to 
achieve. 
Schlesinger took to the task of making cuts with great gusto, firing or 
forcing into early retirement nearly 7% of the CIA’s total workforce, with the 
disproportionate share of the cuts falling on the clandestine side of the house. 
Former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner (1977-81) estimated the number 
of terminations to be 630.lxxvi Helms put the figure at 1,000.lxxvii Ray Cline, one of 
the CIA’s top analysts on the Soviet Union, has suggested that it was nearer 
2,000.lxxviii 
Schlesinger had needed no convincing to carry out the purge. He regarded 
the CIA as complacent, inefficient, and unwilling to keep with the times because, 
in his view, it was run by a bunch of like-minded old friends only interested in 
preserving their personal power base. His first words at Langley were, ‘This is a 
gentleman’s club, and I am no gentleman’.lxxix In his memoirs, Colby remarked that 
Schlesinger felt there were ‘far too many “old boys” around the place doing little 
more than looking after each other, playing spy games and reliving the halcyon past 
of their OSS and early Cold War derring-do days’.lxxx  
Schlesinger had a particularly negative opinion of the clandestine service 
wing of the CIA, which he hit the hardest, considering it a ‘retirement home’ for 
aging veterans of the purported “golden age” of covert action in the 1950s, 
hopelessly out of touch with the intelligence requirements of the modern age. He 
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was highly sceptical of the ‘can do’ ethos that pervaded the DO and by extension 
the CIA as a whole, believing that this was a myth and a source of the agency’s 
woes. As he liked to remind staff, there had been little evidence of it at the ill-fated 
Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, where some 1,300 CIA-trained Cuban exiles 
had been soundly defeated within hours of hitting the beach; lest staff forget, even 
attempts to make Castro’s beard fall out had failed. By living off imaginary past 
glories, he worried that the DO had too much influence not only within CIA, but 
also within government. Reportedly, he referred to it as ‘Helms’ Praetorian Guard’ 
and promised to ‘bust it up’.lxxxi Unsurprisingly, when Nixon discovered that 
Schlesinger had made the deepest cuts in the DO, he was delighted. The DO was 
dominated by the haughty Ivy Leaguers who, in his view, gossiped about him at 
cocktail parties. In a short conversation with Kissinger on 23 February to celebrate 
the news, he described the DO as ‘over-staffed, over-aged, and unproductive’ 
before asking rhetorically ‘what the hell is it producing?’, which earned the 
response ‘very little’. ‘Some of these guys, Henry’, he continued, ‘go back to the 
OSS days. Anybody from the OSS is just too damn old. Don’t you think so?’, to 
which Kissinger replied ‘Oh, yeah, Oh, God yes’. Before ending the conversation, 
both agreed that Helms could never have pulled it off because (in Kissinger’s 
words) ‘that was his own service. These were all his boys’.lxxxii A few days later, on 
1 March, Haldeman told Schlesinger that ‘He [Nixon] is in full accord with your 




There was nothing inherently wrong with making cuts. The CIA had 
reached record staffing levels owing to the Agency’s involvement in Southeast 
Asia, but with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, bringing 
into effect a ceasefire, it made sense to reduce some of the so-called “Vietnam 
Bulge”. Moreover, it was laudable for young blood to be given a chance, since 
opportunities for promotion had historically been limited by the abundance of 
aging officers in senior positions. It should be said that Schlesinger was not alone 
in thinking that the CIA – especially the DO – needed cutting. When Turner 
became Director in March 1997, he continued and accelerated the purge in what 
became known as the “Halloween Massacre’. In his memoir, Secrecy and Democracy 
(1985), Turner painted a terrifying picture of an organisation almost beyond his 
control owing to the power of an entrenched and unethical old-boy network, 
especially within the clandestine division.lxxxiv From day one, he found himself 
frustrated and hamstrung by independent fiefdoms within the Agency, chief 
among them the DO, which, he believed, obsessively guarded its turf and secrets 
from any interference – even from the director. Turner’s Deputy, Frank Carlucci, 
likened the director’s office to the command centre of a power plant – but with all 
the switches deactivated.lxxxv As an aficionado of technical methods of collection – 
information gathered by satellites, computers, radar tracking, the bugging of 
conversations, etc – Turner worried that too many spooks operating in 
hermetically-sealed compartments encouraged unethical practices and could 
embroil the entire agency in a devastating scandal. Indeed, his memoir gave the 
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example of certain case officers, on the pretext of meeting their assets abroad, 
using their travel “expenses” to fund mistresses and private business meetings with 
arms dealers.  
The Schlesinger purge might also be seen as an extension of a broader 
backlash occurring at the time against what Robert Dean has termed the “imperial 
brotherhood”.lxxxvi In the early 1970s, serious questions were being asked about 
how American policymakers, despite their proclaimed rational pragmatism, could 
have committed the United States to such a long, bloody, and humiliating war in 
Vietnam. According to Dean, the answer for many people went beyond the 
imperatives of anti-communist ideology or any strategic calculations about the 
‘national interest’. Just as important was the idea that the United States had been 
dragged into the conflict by the beliefs systems and ingrained habits of 
“Establishment Men” who dominated the national security state in the Cold War. 
As the products of all-male boarding schools, Ivy League fraternities and collegiate 
secret societies, metropolitan men’s clubs, and elite military units, such individuals, 
suggests Dean, were imbued with a tough-minded and self-assured ideology of 
upper-class masculinity, bound up with stoic ideals of competition, duty, and 
sacrifice, that encouraged the pursuit of aggressive intervention abroad to expand 
American power. Although further research is needed in this area, one can 
speculate that Schlesinger’s purge of the DO was part of a larger dissatisfaction 
brewing in American society with the culture of privileged male enclaves whose 
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apparent penchant for freewheeling and force had had such disastrous 
consequences.   
What made the purge particularly controversial was the way Schlesinger 
went about the dismissals, later described by Turner as ‘unconscionable and lacking 
humanity’.lxxxvii From the comfort of his office, he would inspect a list of officers 
and crudely announce, ‘He’s been here twenty years, that’s long enough, out’.lxxxviii 
Ruthless in the extreme, the individual tasked with drawing up the list was also 
fired, unceremoniously told at the end of the process to ‘add his name to the 
list’!lxxxix Dismissed employees were given a blunt two-paragraph letter stating, ‘It 
has been decided that your services are no longer needed’.xc Some even received 
dismissal slips “COB” – close of business that day – denying them the opportunity 
for any sort of leaving ceremony. As Gabriel has argued, miasma thrives in 
organisations where there is downsizing without either separation rituals or 
psychological mourning.xci Men and women with years of experience were 
summarily fired without any flexibility, including officers only weeks from securing 
a higher pension. When the old hands accused Schlesinger of lacking compassion, 
he scoffed: ‘Don’t talk to me about compassion; the only compassion I’ve got is 
for the American taxpayer’.xcii Instead of communicating to colleagues that he 
wanted to give the Agency a new sense of direction and purpose by affording 
younger people the headroom to advance, in the corridors at Langley he was 
repeatedly over-heard referring to the old-timers as ‘deadwood’, ‘dead meat’, and 
‘misfits’ that had outlived their usefulness, a ghastly slur for individuals who had 
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served with devotion for many years. Some staff considered bringing a lawsuit to 
stop the massacre, but this came to nothing since everyone was aware of the 
strength of the mandate from the White House.xciii  
The purge was a direct assault on the culture of the CIA. Indeed, if 
Schlesinger had fired more in the analysis branch, the Directorate of Intelligence 
(DI), and less in the DO, it is possible that the reaction from the Agency would 
have been more restrained. The DO had a special place in CIA history. Many of its 
members – from the spies sent overseas to break the laws of other countries, to 
the planners and executors of covert action – were the stuff of CIA legend. In the 
words of one retired CIA operations officer, ‘the covert side is the real CIA’.xciv 
Tom Polgar, a former CIA Station Chief in Saigon, has said that: ‘In my 
experience...there is no substitute for having your own reporting sources in the 
field who can tell you what is going on’.xcv  
The bulk of the individuals who were shown the door were the tough old 
soldiers, instilled with the outlook of the imperial brotherhood, who had been 
instrumental in forging the CIA’s operating principles. They included such 
heavyweights as Bronson Tweedy, Princeton class of 37, a former Vienna station 
chief and deputy director under Helms; Cord Meyer, Yale class of 43; and Thomas 
Karamessines, Columbia class of 38, who, as Deputy Director for Plans, had been 
actively involved in the CIA’s efforts to destabilize the government of President 
Salvadore Allende in Chile.xcvi Historically, the DO’s instinct for self-preservation 
had been unbreakable. By decimating its ranks, Schlesinger was sending a clear 
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message: the day of the clandestine operator – a class of men with a predisposition 
for action, not analysis – was ending.xcvii As he declared in a speech in the CIA’s 
main auditorium, intelligence was ‘going to be a 20 year career’, populated by desk 
jockeys staring at computers.xcviii His vision for the future foregrounded ‘spies in 
the sky’ – not humans. 
The general consensus among CIA officers was that, while reform was 
probably overdue, firings such as these took away too much muscle along with the 
fat, leaving a void of experience. Previously top heavy with cold warriors, the CIA 
became bottom heavy with beginners. ‘Some of those who left’, Helms has written, 
‘took with them a store of language, operational skills, and area knowledge which, 
even with their possibly diminished energy, might usefully have been retained – if 
necessary by some contrived “on the shelf” arrangement’.xcix  Of course, given his 
background and affection for the DO in particular, one would expect Helms to say 
nothing less. 
The abrupt sacking of these experienced pioneers was devastating to morale. 
According to Cline, confidence reached ‘an all-time low’; certain people stopped 
turning up for work.c While recognising that any organisation that suffered such a 
reduction in personnel might be demoralised, what made the cuts especially hurtful 
at CIA was the cruel methods of termination, plus the perception that the firings 
were designed to placate an insecure and manipulative President, rather than give 
the Agency new energy and relevance. As Robert Gates has suggested, rather than 
be excited by the prospect of new opportunities that might come their way, the 
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younger generation at CIA were horrified that so many talented people had been 
canned and began fearing for their own jobs.ci In an environment where the feeling 
was that loyalty to the politics of Richard Nixon was valued more by the Director 
than professional expertise, people walked on egg shells: step out of line and they 
would be next.  Moreover, some felt guilty for having survived when so many 
others had not. Although they had done nothing wrong, they were sensitive to a 
sense of fairness and were uncomfortable with the dismissals being ‘unfair’ in their 
favour.  
Cord Meyer has written that morale is the CIA’s ‘most precious 
commodity’.cii It boosts efficiency – a motivated workforce is a productive 
workforce – but also serves as ‘protection against penetration by the KGB’.ciii 
Schlesinger’s purge, he has claimed, started to unravel the ‘fabric of mutual trust’ 
that had held the agency together as a disciplined organisation over many years. 
Similarly, Helms has written: ‘The bond between the CIA management and 
personnel – an essential element in the security of any intelligence agency – was 
seriously damaged’.civ Suddenly, the CIA had to worry about those who had been 
fired taking their grievances and knowledge of the secret world to the press, which 
some of them did. Indeed, it has been claimed by some that the purge might have 
accelerated Nixon’s resignation by encouraging angry employees to leak to the 




At Langley, the umbrage caused by the purge was such that Schlesinger had 
to be accompanied by an increased security detail, on task to protect him from 
vexed underlings. For fear of being harangued or even physically assaulted, 
Schlesinger stopped visiting the Office of Technical Services (OTS), the CIA’s real-
life “Q-Branch” that provided gadgets and disguises to the clandestine services. 
When a visitor requested if he could have a tour of the OTS, Schlesinger replied: ‘I 
can’t take you through there. I don’t think either one of us would emerge alive!’cv 
That, however, was as far as the resistance went: the suffering and the savagery 





In May 1973, barely three months after Schlesinger had arrived at Langley, Nixon 
announced his appointment as Elliot Richardson’s successor as Secretary of 
Defense, starting on 2 July. Nixon needed someone who would be tough with 
both Congress, which, with the Vietnam War winding down, was looking to cut 
spending on nuclear and conventional arsenals, and Moscow, which had achieved 
virtual nuclear parity. Specifically, the President wanted Schlesinger to spearhead a 
flexible counterforce nuclear strategy, based around the idea of retaliatory strikes 
against meaningful Soviet military targets (such as ICBM installations), to limit the 
possibility of assured destruction. Some years later, Schlesinger recollected that 
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from this moment onwards his mind was focused almost exclusively on his new 
job, meaning that he devoted little energy to running the CIA and even less to 
managing the intelligence community as a whole.cvi However, this did not stop him 
from leaving a parting gift of enormous significance, and in doing so changing the 
course of CIA history. 
By early May, the press was awash with stories linking the CIA with the 
unfolding Watergate scandal. Information surfaced suggesting that two of the 
Watergate burglars, E. Howard Hunt and James McCord (both ex-CIA 
employees), had received technical assistance from the Agency as they had carried 
out dirty tricks for the President. In testimony before a federal grand jury, Hunt 
revealed his role in the September 1971 break-in at the Los Angeles office of Dr. 
Lewis Fielding, the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, the defense analyst who had 
leaked the Pentagon Papers. Embarrassingly, Hunt testified that the CIA had 
supplied him with disguises and a camera.cvii Schlesinger was dismayed by the 
revelations, considering them a violation of the CIA’s charter, which prohibited 
domestic operations. Particularly vexing to him was the fact that he had learned 
about them not from his staff, but from the Washington Post. ‘I didn’t know what 
was going on’, he later recalled, ‘Because, you know, I would read about something 
in the morning in the papers and by the afternoon, I was being called up to the Hill 
to explain it’.cviii In Schlesinger’s eyes, the grubby affair was further proof that there 




Naturally, he wondered what other landmines existed under his feet. ‘What 
else have you been hiding from me?’, he quizzed Colby, then deputy director for 
operations.cix Schlesinger was particularly concerned about how many of these 
landmines might be known to the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, having 
been told by one of his assistants, Angus Thuermer, that the reporter was ‘pussy-
footing around on a big intelligence story’.cx Colby, however, did not know. With 
this, Schlesinger threatened to tear the Agency apart – and ‘fire everyone if 
necessary’ – to determine if any more nasty surprises awaited him.cxi The fact that 
Colby, a senior insider with thirty years of experience, could not tell him what the 
CIA had been doing was deeply troubling and was interpreted as yet more 
evidence of a failing culture.  On 9 May, therefore, he issued a directive (drafted by 
Colby) to all CIA employees, from entry-level clerks to senior officers, 
commanding them to report immediately any activities, both in the past and 
ongoing, which might appear to be in violation of the agency’s legislative charter.cxii 
He also instructed Thuermer to give him a ‘‘rundown’ on what is known on 
Hersh’s efforts so far’.cxiii By the end of the month, Colby had collected a 
staggering 693 pages of possible infractions, spanning the CIA’s entire history. The 
list of abuses included plots to assassinate foreign leaders (for example, Cuba’s 
Fidel Castro and the Congo’s Patrice Lumumba); drug experimentation on 
unwitting American citizens; and a domestic surveillance program called Operation 
CHAOS, involving wiretaps, bugging, mail opening, and various ‘black bag’ jobs.cxiv 
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At Langley, employees referred to the compilation of confessions as the “Family 
Jewels”.  
As prize-winning journalist Tim Weiner has argued, Schlesinger’s order to 
staff to come clean about the CIA’s deepest secrets ‘violated every precept of a 
secret agency’.cxv In short, it was an assault on the culture. Cord Meyer has claimed 
that certain colleagues used it as a ‘hunting license’ to dig up old records in a bid to 
find incriminating details about their superiors. Others, he continued, regarded it as 
an invitation to resurrect ‘old unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago’ in an 
effort to prove ‘in the perspective of the present that they had been right in the 
dimly remembered past’.cxvi ‘There are very few human institutions in the world’, 
Meyer has written, ‘from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Boy Scouts, 
that could survive in good working order so broad an injunction to confess all past 
improprieties or mistakes in judgement, least of all an intelligence agency whose 
job it is to operate outside the law in foreign countries’.cxvii Interviewed some years 
later, Schlesinger suggested that it was never his intention to issue such a sweeping 
directive, saying that he ‘wasn’t really interested in unearthing things from the past’ 
and only wanted to know about possible CIA involvement with Watergate and the 
so-called ‘Plumbers’.cxviii  
The explosive ramifications of Schlesinger’s directive were not felt for 
another 18 months – long after Schlesinger himself had left the CIA and the blast 
zone, so to speak. After he had been nominated to succeed Schlesinger as DCI, 
Colby controversially handed the “Family Jewels” over to a few select members of 
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Congress, believing that in order for the Agency to move forward it needed to go 
through a period of self-catharsis. In keeping with their traditional ‘hear-no-evil, 
see-no-evil’ approach to intelligence matters, the committee chairmen kept the 
contents to themselves.cxix However, in true Washington style, the “Family Jewels” 
were leaked. On 22 December 1974, Hersh broke the CHAOS story in a stunning 
front-page splash in The New York Times. On 28 February 1975, Daniel Schorr of 
CBS News spoke on air about assassination plots, claiming that the CIA might 
have literal skeletons in its closet. Two months later Helms, by most accounts a 
mild-mannered man, confronted Schorr and called him a ‘son of a bitch’ and a 
‘cocksucker’ for revealing what he called ‘the biggest secret of all’.cxx  
Amidst allegations that the CIA was spying at home, the inference being 
that it had become a Gestapo, Congress was compelled to investigate. By the time 
the season of enquiry was over, the CIA had been subject to the most intense 
public scrutiny of any intelligence agency in world history, ultimately leading to the 
creation of permanent select committees on intelligence. Described by one scholar 
as the ‘most important example’ of a ‘Power Earthquake’, dozens of intelligence 
officers were dragooned to the witness table, almost for public sport, and the 
secrets tumbled out.cxxi In what came as a shock to many of his colleagues, who 
believed in giving only bare-bone answers to commissioners, Colby worked on the 
assumption that the Agency’s survival depended on a policy of controlled co-
operation, not secrecy and stonewalling, and opted therefore to accede as much as 
possible to their requests for sensitive information. Acolytes of Richard Helms, 
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who applauded him for perjuring himself rather than revealing secrets to 
investigators (hence his epithet ‘the man who kept the secrets’), were appalled. 
Among this crowd, Colby became arguably even more persona non grata than 
Schlesinger. James Angleton, the CIA’s fabled chief of counter-intelligence, even 
told friends that he wondered if Colby might be working for the ‘other side’.cxxii 
Although the “Family Jewels” were to an extent a product of the very culture that 
Schlesinger had wanted to change, he later remarked that he was ‘mortified by the 





In conclusion, this article has tried to shine light on James Schlesinger’s tenure as 
CIA Director, the shortest of any DCI in history. Specifically, it has attempted to 
explain why this deceptively tweedy spy chief was so unpopular at the CIA, and 
consider the consequences for the Agency of the dislike toward him. Hitherto, we 
have been led to believe that the hatred stemmed largely from his decision to 
commission the “Family Jewels”, the notorious list of misdeeds that would leave 
the Agency mired in scandal. It has been shown, however, that the discontent went 
much deeper than this; anguish over the “Family Jewels” was more a symptom 
than a cause of the bad blood. 
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Fundamentally, Schlesinger was disliked because he looked to change the 
CIA’s culture and habitual actions. Having made his mark in Washington as a 
tamer of bloated bureaucracies, he arrived at Langley as a usurper with a directive 
to strengthen the Executive Branch’s grip on the CIA as a secret instrument of 
policy. The buccaneering clandestine operators who evoked the spirit of Wild Bill’s 
OSS and had pride of place in CIA mythology were immediately targeted for 
extinction, to be replaced by a streamlined, younger, workforce less preoccupied 
with risky foreign adventures and increasingly reliant on technical rather than 
human methods of collection. Like Nixon, he believed that the CIA had grown 
complacent and inefficient under their influence. To borrow the phrase of 
organizational theorist Martin Parker, he regarded them as ‘nostalgic ostriches’ 
who refused to accept that the world had moved on from the perceived golden age 
of covert action in the early Cold War.cxxiv The irony here, of course, is that while 
Schlesinger was trying to stamp out the freewheeling and unconstitutional 
behaviour of the CIA, across the beltway Nixon was carrying out his own 
campaign of unaccountable ‘dirty tricks’ from the White House, from bugging the 
phones of colleagues and journalists to burglarizing a psychiatrist’s office to find 
files on a political opponent.   
It is hard to escape the conclusion that Schlesinger failed as a spy chief. A 
good intelligence leader should be a centripetal force that brings people together 
and closer to a shared core. By contrast, Schlesinger was a centrifugal force that 
drove people away and crushed morale. Clearly, there is no easy or graceful way to 
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reform an organisation, whilst his goal of modernising the CIA and re-assessing its 
working practices was probably overdue. Indeed, the “Family Jewels” violations 
were, many would argue, the product of the very culture that Schlesinger was 
looking to overhaul. But, the hard-right rudder way he went about it was poorly 
conceived, causing waves of anxiety and discontent to wash over the workforce. 
Moreover, his failure to communicate properly the benefits of his reform agenda 
left many people fearing for their livelihood unless they accepted the President and 
his program without question. The dark side of Nixon – mean-spirited, sore loser, 
bad temper, vindictive, quick to take the bait and lash out – took corporeal form in 
Schlesinger. His heavy-handed approach, coupled with being perceived as Nixon’s 
attack dog, resulted in a state of miasma at CIA, characterised by a demoralised 
and unproductive staff, plus an absence of resistance. As some of his obituaries 
noted, no one ever doubted his brains; it was the manner in which he used them 
that stuck in the craw.cxxv  
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